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BOOK REVIEWS
MEMOIRS BY HARRY S. TRUMAN, Volume One, Year of Decisions.
Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, N. Y., 1955. $5.00.
At the outset, the book is unique because it is the only book of its kind
ever produced. This is the record which illustrates graphically the lines from
the Old Testament, "And the mantle of Elijah fell on Elisha." No other President has ever compiled a comparable record of his administration and his views
on the Presidency. Hereafter one seeking to be President is on notice of the
tremendous burdens of that office. Here is a detailed account of the thousand
and one problems that must be considered and resolved. The author is an amazing person for two reasons: first, because he accomplished all these momentous
tasks with nothing more than a high school education and second, because at
the age of thirty-eight, he was a complete failure in business, insolvent, and
with a wife and two year old daughter to support. In spite of these momentary
difficulties, he survived to serve ten years in the Senate, three months as VicePresident, and President of the United States during the most critical time in
its history.
Law students and lawyers are supposed to be, at least, students of American
history. Mr. Truman did not have that onus cast upon him by his chosen calling, but he accepted it voluntarily and therein lies much of his power to handle
the problems he faced. His knowledge of history appears time after time in
this volume, and he illustrates graphically how that knowledge served him well.
This portion of the book alone is inspirational from the student's standpoint.
The intimate pictures of Stalin, Churchhill, Eisenhower, Eden and countless others on the American scene are an invaluable contribution to our historical
records. The story of the author's work on the Truman Committee is a complete eye-opener to those who may believe that service in the United States Senate is a winter vacation. The complete record of a telephone conversation between Churchhill and Truman before the surrender of Germany is a close-up
of international parlance, the like of which has perhaps never before appeared
in print. The role of the Vice-President is described with great clarity. Should
you be cynical and say that this man was too much a politician, read the book
and decide for yourself whether you could handle the job of the Presidency
with being not only a politician, but a very good one. For those who aspire to
serve as public servants, this book is a must.
Of course, the historical script which destiny wrote for this leading actor
calls for a kaleidoscope of death, destruction, heartache, starvation, diplomacy
and all the other ills and problems that are visited on mankind by total war.
All the more fascinating, therefore, the story, as it unfolds on a national and
international stage. You are there, not with a seat in the balcony, but with a
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place on the stage. You hear the voices of the men who directed and ended
the great war, and those who helped "bind up the Nation's wounds." Let us
hope that this is a precedent which will be faithfully followed by all those who
survive the ordeal of the Presidency and that they will feel dutybound to set
down a personal record of their administration.
After preparing this review, this writer asked the Ex-President the following question: "Is it your opinion that had you been trained as a lawyer and
had had some experience in practice, would the task of serving in the U. S.
Senate and on various important committees, as well as serving as Vice-President and President of the U. S., have been easier for you?" Mr. Truman's reply
was as follows: "I want to say that although knowledge of law is, of course,
of value to a person in public office, it is open to argument whether such training is a real asset.
"Professional men, such as lawyers, doctors and teachers, are not always
successful politicians in administrative jobs. And nearly all of the great collections of laws of the world have been assembled by heads of states who were
not professional lawyers. The two best examples are Justinian and Napoleon.
"The Constitution of the United States was gotten together by men from
all walks of life, and the best arguments were made by those men who were
not lawyers. If it hadn't been for Ben Franklin, I do not think we would have
had the constitution we cherish today."
You will never forget this book any more than you can forget World
War II and its aftermath. Great credit should be given to the fine work of
Professor Francis H. Heller of Kansas University, who did a considerable portion of the work of marshalling the facts.
JOHN WARREN GILES*
* Visiting Professor of Law, University of Kansas Law School.
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THE CHALLENGE OF LAW REFORM, by Arthur T. Vanderbilt.
No one is perhaps better fitted or qualified to write on law reform than
the author of this work. He was an able and experienced lawyer in both the
trial and appellate courts. He is a past president of the American Bar Association, professor of law and later dean of New York University Law School. He
has served as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey since 1948.
Against the opposition of many of the judges, and without the support of
any bar association, he brought about sweeping changes in the court procedure
in New Jersey which have resulted in better administration of the courts and a
clearing of court calendars.
The basis of the book was a series of lectures delivered by the author at
the University of Virginia Law School, which were edited and revised to include comment on things which occurred after the lectures were delivered.
The first chapter is a blistering one dealing with "The Need for Reform."
Typical of this chapter is the comment that "the criminals, the gangsters, the
corrupt officials, the communistic subversives . . . are no more dangerous to
their community and to the country at large than the judges, many of them
amiable gentlemen, who oppose either openly or covertly every change in procedural law and administration that would serve to eliminate technicalities, surprise, and delay...." This strong language would be less offensive if the judiciary could feel that there are few such scoundrels. However, the author removes the cloak of immunity and innocence by stating that the number of such
judges is legion. I suspect most judges are acclimated to the slings and arrows
of outraged litigants, but to be classed by the legion with gangsters and subversives, by a fellow judge, will come to many as the unkindest cut of all. Fortunately, there are many judges who properly hold their brethren in higher
esteem.
Despite language of which the above is a sample, the bench and bar will
do well to consider the needs referred to and the means required to meet them.
At the conclusion of the first chapter, the author lists four sectors in which
improvement in judicial reform is needed: (1) to obtain better judges and
jurors; (2) to abolish some of the miscellaneous courts and bring into being
an integrated court system; (3) to eliminate the delays in the judicial processes
by substituting, for the cumbersome legislative codes, flexible rules of court, to
govern procedure, which can be altered with facility; (4) by modernization and
simplification of the substantive law through the efforts of law-centers.
The chapter on improvement of the personnel of the courts points out that
judges elected by the people are not only unknown in any English speaking
common law country but everywhere else except Russia and its satellites. Except for an attempt to give the basis for the practice of electing judges in the
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United States, little is said on the matter of selecting judges that has not been
said before. The author admits that the caliber of the judiciary cannot be improved until a declaration of the qualifications of a jurist is produced. This has
always seemed to us to be the real problem to be faced whether judges are
hand-picked by a select committee or whether they are elected. The author has
failed, as have most others who criticize the present system, to lay down any
yardstick with which to measure judicial timber.
The case on simplification of judicial structure and procedure is more clearly proved. The review of the history of procedure is not only interesting but
points up the need for reform and improvement. The necessity for the use of
pre-trial conferences is well established. Although few jurists are able to do
so, under the present practices, there can be little doubt that the ability to read
briefs before argument would greatly assist the courts in obtaining a clearer
view of the problems involved, and would result in more expeditious decisions.
This phase of the treatise, it appears to us, will prove to be the least controversial and the most helpful.
The chapter on judicial administration concerns itself with the new system of administration of the courts under the Chief Justice and a judicial administrator which the author put into effect in New Jersey, and with the inadequate systems in the federal courts and in the State of New York. The truth
of the adage that justice delayed is justice denied must be accepted. There is,
likewise, little doubt that ways and means of bringing about an earlier disposition of cases must be found. We doubt if many lawyers or judges will desire to institute the New Jersey system under which judges are required, in
effect, to punch a clock. Few readers will, we believe, feel that the many hardworking jurists should be reduced to the stature of clerks because a few lack
ambition. Chief Justice Horace Stern, of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, by
the dint of hard work and elimination of juries cleared up a back-log of 3,000
cases when he was a judge of the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia, without any drastic change in the system of judicial administration. By the system
of requiring judges in Pennsylvania to report all matters in their hands and
undecided after sixty days, Chief Justice Stern has taken steps far less drastic,
but nonetheless effective, to find which jurists are dragging their feet. It is
possible that the threat of the fate that has befallen the judges in New Jersey
may serve as a Boogey-Man to spur all judges to improve the condition of their
calendars. Such would be a laudable contribution.
The chapter on modernization of the law contains the startling statement
that "the number of great textbooks has been far less in the first half of the
twentieth century than it was in the first half of the nineteenth." The author
refers to the ever increasing volume of decisions and the need for text treatises
to reduce the time required in research. The suggestion that law-centers be
established to modernize the law is entirely appropriate. Until they are estab-
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lished and produce results, we must rely on the digests and encyclopedias, together with the various restatements, to produce the precedents for present day
decisions. One cannot help but contrast the position of a John Bannister Gibson, riding the circuit with his law library in his book bag, with that of the
present day jurist with his shelf-lined library. Gibson may have felt be had
too few precedents; perhaps today we have too many.
The Challenge of Law Reform is a very readable treatise. It is written in
an easy style and will be of interest to both layman and lawyer. While many may
differ with the author, much that he said badly needed saying.
DALE
* President Judge, Ninth Judicial District.

F. SHUGHART*
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LAW OF NEGLIGENCE IN THE ATLANTIC STATES, by Harvey G.
Stevenson; Gann Law Books, 1954 (three volumes).
Harvey G. Stevenson, a practicing attorney of New Jersey before the publication of this book, attained an excellent reputation among lawyers in New
Jersey for his authorship of The Negligence Law in New Jersey (1945) and
Practiceand Procedurein New Jersey (1949).
The foreword of this three volume set commences with,
"This work is a text on the law of negligence. Its specific purpose
is to provide a source of reference to the law, decisions and statutes
dealing with negligence, of the jurisdictions whose opinions are reportec[ in the Atlantic Reporter, namely Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont."
To one who either specializes in the field of negligence law either on
one side or the other, or for that matter for the busy practitioner of today, regardless of specialization, text books must have certain attributes in order to
make them valuable and worthwhile. They must have a thought expression which
is clear, concise and to the point. They must have ample authorities cited so
that from these authorities others may be found. The citations must be accurate,
not only from the standpoint of the references, but also from the standpoint
that the references mentioned do, in fact, support the principles set forth in
the text. Such books must also have an index with subject matter references
and appropriate cross references to further save time in locating the desired
topic or sub-division. Such books should also have a table of contents which
will clearly and quickly offer the researcher the contents of the book in a more
general fashion than the index. Such books should also be kept up to date through
pocket parts so that they do not lose their value in the usual short time that
it takes for hosts of other decisions to circumscribe, over-rule or otherwise define the principles in the text. All of these attributes Law of Negligence in the
Atlantic States contains. Actually there is a great deal more. For example, the
print is large, not only in the text proper but also in the footnotes and, it may
also be added, in the pocket parts.
The Table of Contents outlines each of the chapter headings of the three
volumes. This is repeated in each volume.
Volume 1 contains the chapters on general principles of negligence and
specific negligence principles applicable to particular businesses or occupations,
or to general classifications, such as "Explosives in General", "Electric Utility
Companies", "Gas Utility Companies", "Food", "Food in Containers", "Invitees on Land", "Stores", "Theaters, Shows and Amusements", etc.
Volume 2 deals with chapters on "Trespassers on Land", "Municipalities",
"Streets and Sidewalks", "Car Owners Liability", "Passengers in Car", "Railroads", "Common Carriers", "Charitable Institutions", etc.
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Volume 3 deals with "Hotels and Inns", "Animals", "Master and Servant", "Res Ipsa Loquitur", and "Family Relations", etc.
What is quoted here are only examples. Volume 1 contains 30 chapters;
Volume 2 contains 16 chapters, and Volume 3 contains 8 chapters.
There is hardly a principle, if any, that is not supported by a citation which
in turn demonstrates even further the particular principle. For example, on page
955 of Volume 2, the first paragraph under Section 635, which bears the caption "Vehicle must be reasonably safe," states:
"The general rule of law is well settled that the owner of a motor
vehicle must exercise such care with respect to it as not to subject others
to unreasonable risk of injury from its operation. There are numerous
precautions which an owner must take to make that instrumentality
reasonably safe and appropriate for use on the public highways. Failure
to take these precautions, by reason of which injury occurs, is action-,
able negligence."
Cases from Maine and Pennsylvania are cited. The case of Delair v. McAdoo' is followed with this:
"Left rear tire blew out due to age and condition."
And it is the same with the other three Pennsylvania cases cited along with
the Delair case. Such is true with most of the cases cited.
The National Reporter System reference is given, where possible, along
with the official citation wherever possible, and the date of the opinion is given.
For the busy practitioner, or for the one who does not have his state reports
but does have the Atlantic Reporter, this set is even more valuable.
HERBERT HORN*

* Member of the New Jersey Bar.

1 324 Pa. 392, 188 At.

181 (1936).
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THE MORAL DECISION, by Edmond Cahn; Indiana University Press,
1955.
This book assumes of its readers only that they be literate and affected or
troubled by the moral confusion of the times. Since it is a very good
book, it should be read by every thinking man and woman. My remarks here,
however, are prompted by the feeling that it is of especial interest and value to
lawyers. Too often, when a discussion of moral questions is broached, lawyers
beat a hasty retreat. They may feel that such discussions are bound to wind up
in a Serbonian bog of meaningless abstractions or, while seriously lamenting
the moral confusion of our times, they may regard it as outside their professional competence and thus best left to be sorted out by philosophers or theologians.
Now Professor Cahn has performed a remarkable feat, which like so many
remarkable feats leaves you amazed that nothing quite like it has been attempted
before. He has sharply focused an inquiry into the problems of moral decisions by harnessing it to the rich experience of the social institution which is
concerned from beginning to end with the painstaking development of decisional processes-the law.
Systematically, by the use of decided cases involving problems covering the
span of life, we are shown how we can learn not only about law from morals,
but about morals from law.
This should be enough to tempt even the tired, overworked attorney, whose
non-professional reading matter encompasses usually no more than the newspaper and the current best selling novel. My guess, based on experience, is
that many an interesting and fruitful discussion will follow. Since the book is
worth reading, I shall not attempt to summarize it in usual book review fashion,
but shall restrict myself to a few comments.
Those who have read Professor Cahn's The Sense of Injustice will not be
surprised at the flowing style and the author's great fund of historical and literary knowledge. Indeed, the temptation to turn the page in search for the
next anecdotal gem, rather than stop and think, may occasionally prove too great.
The book is sub-titled "Right and Wrong in the Light of American Law"
and Parts II and III are entitled "Moral Guides in the American Law of Rights"
and "Moral Guides in the American Law of Procedure" respectively. Anyone
casually picking up the book and noting this may perhaps be pardoned for assuming that the author seeks to clear up the moral confusion of the times by
pointing to legal decisions involving moral issues as providing authoritative
*moral standards which need only be logically applied in various situations to
yield the "correct" moral decision. Nothing could be farther from the truth as
P r o f e s s o r Cahn explicitly points out in the opening pages and yet
even some who have read the book appear to persist in this misunderstand-
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ing. At the risk of adding some misconceptions of my own, let me hazard a
guess as to a possible reason for this failure to join issue.
In Part I, Professor Cahn develops a sensitive if necessarily abstract description of the moral decision as the epitome of the moral process. The description of the process in terms of the "Moral Constitution" and "Moral Legislation" is obviously more immediately meaningful to the lawyer. But precisely
his familiarity with the frame of reference may tend to prevent the lawyer
from looking as closely at the picture as he should. If the reader succumbs to
this temptation, the stage for the concrete, illustrative, "prismatic" part of the
book is imperfectly set and misunderstanding becomes inevitable.
Suppose then that it is clear that the reader will not look for definitive
solutions to all and sundry moral problems, what guides can he hope to discover?
Part I may have made him more aware of the necessary elements of a rational
decision, but surely this has no normative significance. Here again the lawyer
has an advantage. He is aware how after reading numerous cases, suddenly (or
so it appears), his "sense of touch" has been sharpened. Similarily what the
courts do in the cases set out in Parts II and III and what the author does in
commenting, may defy precise, step by step description, but a procedural pattern emerges. Perhaps, the reader will find it useful to make his own "prismatic"
use of the case, to follow through his own associations and comparisons, before reading the author's comments. This may highlight differences in "moral
constitutions" as well as in the "re-working" of the "moral legislative" process.
Indeed, the reader may become conscious of more uncertainties in the decisional process as he goes along. Primary imprints of group standards may
be strongly felt, but mistrusted and overcome - as is the case of the former
Czech statesman who stated that he was "emotionally" anti-semitic but would
not let this influence his actions. When the need to make a decision is felt the
consequences of alternative choices may be hard to gauge, much searching for
analogous situations may have to be done and a final decision is not necessarily
accomplished with a satisfying "click" resolving all agony. However, anyone
persuaded or better equipped to engage whole-heartedly in this process shoulders
rather than avoids a responsibility. And who can doubt the benefit of that?
EDGAR

* Assistant Professor, Dickinson School of Law.

R.

CASPER*
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THE GUILTY MIND: PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW OF HOMICIDE,
John Biggs, Jr.; Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1955. 236 pp. $4.50.
This is the kind of book which makes for an intelligent and a necessary
understanding of the evolution of law. Written by the chief judge of the Third
Judicial Circuit, it is for the citizen-lawyer, and doctor also, who should know
something about the relation of science to legal principles. This volume, the
third in the distinguished Issac Ray Award Series, is the first to be written by
an author with a legal background.
The first lecture is a brief survey of the medico-religious beginnings of
law and psychiatry. The author shows how primitive man was "law abiding"
as we know the term today, although there was no legal process as we understand it. Brief statements are given concerning the Greek, Hebrew, Egyptian,
Chinese and Hindu systems of law as they relate to the concept of the guilty
mind.
When Roman law is examined the author finds such words as "dementia",
"pagan madness", and "audacious madness" which indicate an interest in mental
problems of criminals. While there was a gradual development of the concept
of the guilty mind, there is no evidence that it was employed in relation to the
state of mind of mentally ill or insane persons who had committed crimes.
By the time of the Visigothic Code in Europe, compiled between 649-652, there
was some recognition of criminal intent which must be credited to the Roman
Christian influences.
Judge Biggs next traces the scientific development beginning with the
Renaissance and its effect on law. During this period there came what he calls
"pseudo-scientists" who were still saturated with the belief of demonology and
witchcraft which had foundations in Biblical sanctions. The moving force of
witchcraft was rebellion against existing society. The author shows how Jean
Bodin, for example, brought into sharp focus the irrational divergence of opinion
between medicine and law in all criminal cases in which a death sentence is
mandatory and in which a plea of insanity is interposed. Beginning with Swiss
Felix Platter, a sixteenth century physician, the author describes the struggles
to treat mental illness. To Americans the work of Dr. Benjamin Rush is both
of interest and importance. While his methods were like those of the doctors
of the time, he deserves the title of "Father of American Psychiatry".
The fourth lecture outlines the development of the concept of the guilty
mind in the law of England until the appearance of the McNaughten rules. Beginning with an early treatise on land law written by Sir Thomas de Littleton
in the fifteenth century, in which civil rights of the insane later received recognition, we find greater attention is given to this topic, reaching, in 1812, the
famous John Bellingham case. During the nineteenth century the doctrine of
phrenology had a very important influence upon the concept of the guilty mind.
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Such men as Horace Mann and Walt Whitman accepted fully the beliefs. In
two cases-the Parker case and the Bowler case-the tests of being able to
distinguish between right and wrong lead to the principles given in the McNaughten case. The author, after showing how these rules have become an
integral part of American law, concludes that "the time is now ripe to point
out . . . [that] the divergence between law and psychiatry is caused in part

by the legal fiction represented by the words 'insanity' or 'insane' which are
a kind of lawyer's catchall and have not clinical meaning".
The fifth lecture contains a very interesting selection of cases which show
the divergence between law and psychiatry. As the author points out, the importance of criminal intent-mens rea-should be borne in mind: that unless
the accused possesses a criminal intent, he shall not be punishable for his offending act. This should -be a disturbing chapter to any citizen who may find
himself before a criminal court. Judge Biggs believes the McNaughten rules
constitute a public danger because the mental competency of recidivists should
be questioned by realistic means at the earliest possible stages. As long as courts
judge the criminal responsibility by tests of knowledge of right and wrong,
psychotics who have served prison terms or have been granted probation will
be repeating again and again their crimes unless treated by mental hospitals
where they should have gone in the first place.
The author is not cynical about the future relationships of psychiatry and
legal interpretation of homicide. In a decision given by the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1954, the McNaughten rules were
found to be useless. Furthermore, the court put the burden of proving sanity
beyond a reasonable doubt on the prosecution. The author quotes with approval
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's views on the guilty mind: "I do not see why the rules
of law should be arrested at the state of psychological knowledge of the time
when they were formulated." No doubt within the next few decades the work
of such groups as the Committee on Psychiatry and Law of the Group for Advancement of Psychiatry will achieve, with our socially minded lawyers and doctors, a more medico-legal definition of the guilty mind. Judge Biggs believes
that statutes such as those in force in Minnesota are among the progressive
types of legislation which have been passed bridging the gap between psychiatry and law.
This volume supplies the need for an informative volume about law and
psychiatry written for the layman and lawyer who has no knowledge of psychiatry.
W_ 41-DR.

WILLIAM

L. LUDLOW*

* Chairman, Departments of Sociology and Political Science, Muskingum College.

LAW REVIEW WRITING CONTEST WINNERS

The editors of the Dickinson Law Review are pleased to announce the following winners of the annual Law Review Writing Contest:
First Prize (Tie):
"Evidence-Testimony of a Juror to Impeach a Verdict"
by Harman R. Clark, Jr.
60 Dick. L. Rev.
"Justice or Revenge"
by Robert G. Meiners
60 Dick. L. Rev.
Third Prize:
"Malicious Prosecution"
by Frank S. Seiders, Jr.
60 Dick. L. Rev. 270

